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The rise in inflation in France did not,
however, have much ofan impact on the
French franc/U.s.dollarexchange rate. One
U.S. dollar bought 5.17 francs in 1914 and
5.45 francs in 1918. The franc failed to
depreciatebyan amountproportional tothe
differential rate ofinflationbetween the U.S.
and France because the central banks
attempted to peg the exchange rate around
the pre-war parity. After the war, when
these pegging operations ceased, the franc
depreciated roughly in line with the rise in
defined. The printingofpaper notes was
controlled by the Banque de France,
although paper money was notlegally
required to be backed by gold or silver
unlikethe legal requirements behind the
paper currencies ofmost other countries,at
the time. Confidence in the central bank of
France was enough, and this confidence
was justified. In over one hundred years,
only twice, duringthe crisis periods of
1848-49 and 1870-73, did the Banque de
France suspend convertibility of its bank
notes into specie. In establishing the French
franc, Napoleon knew well the value ofa
sound currency in providingboth economic
and political stability.
The first majorweakness in the French franc
did notoccuruntil afterthe FirstWorld War.
To a large extent, France had financed the
war by "advances" from the Banque de
France to the French Treasury. Total bank
notes in circulation grew from 5.7 to 37.9
billion francs between the end of 1913 and
the end'of 1920. Eleanor Dulles and Martin
Wolfe, two historians ofthe French franc,
have noted that the growth in bank notes in
circulation was greaterthan thatrequired by
the private sector for the financing of real
economic activity during the war and con-
sequently led to a major increase in French
prices. Retail prices, forexample, rose
by more than 130 percent between 1914
and 1918.
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There are probably many explanations for
the divergent behavior ofthe two curren-
cies, but certainly one must be expectations
of how the c<ontral banks will behave in the
face ofthe increasing financing needs of
their federal governments. In this respect,
the events that led upto the 1926 foreign
exchange market crisis ofthe French franc
provide a useful backdrop and some inter-
esting lessons to the budgetary problems
facing France and the u.s. today.
Historyof the franc
Th<olaw of7 Germinal an· XI (March 28,
1803) established the French franc (defined
as five grams ofsilver nine-tenths fineorthe
equivalent) in terms ofgold-onepart gold
to 15.5 parts silver.
But while the national deficits ofboth
countries are mushrooming, we find quitea
divergence in the behavior ofthe exchange
rate. (See Chart.) The French franc has
depreciated from 4.07 Ffr/$ in December
1979 to 7.6 Ffr/$ in June 1983. The U.S.
dollar, on the otherhand, remains much
strongerthan the relative prices between the
U.S. and its majortrading partners would
seem to warrant.
Although it is an overstatement to suggest
that the French national budget crisis of
1926 has an equal today in the budgetary
and monetary problems ofFrance and the
United States, there are certain similarities
that meritattention. Both the U.S. and
France in the last few years have had record
increases in their national debts. The U.s. is
looking at the prospect ofdoubling its
national debt over the next five years, while
France's total franc-denominated debt is
currently greaterthan Ffr. 400 billion,
compared to Ffr. 150 billion in 1977.
Although it later moved away from bi-
metallism to agold standard, the French
franc remained for 125 years as originally
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inflation. By theend of1920,the U.s. dollar
bought 16.80francs, compared with 5.45
francs two years earlier.
Reparations andthedeficit
Afterthewar, adebateensued regardingthe
abilityofthe French governmenttopay back
its loans to the Banquede France. Thestrong
relationship between note issuance during
the war and the rise in domestic inflation
had been noticed and repayment ofthe
loans was regarded as adeflationary policy.
In December 1920, the Ministerof Finance,
Francois-Marsal, and GovernorRobineau of
the Banque de France reached an agree-
ment, enacted into law, forthe government
to pay the central bank two billion francs
annually. However, only one paymentwas
made. Because ofpost-war reconstruction
expenditures, the total government debt
kept rising, and much ofthe newdebt was
again financed by directadvances from the
central bank.
As with thecostofthewar, littleofthe major
increase in national expenditures was
financed byincreases indirecttaxes. France
had hoped that reparation payments from
GermanywouId coverthe costs ofrecon-
struction, butbecause Germany was suffer-
ing from runaway inflation, the payments
were often delayed and were much smaller
than expected. In January 1923, France sent
its army intothe German Ruhr to obtain
reparation payments by force. The cost of
the occupation, however, proved greater
than the economic benefits. When the
DawesCommitteesubsequentlyworkedout
a plan for German monetary reform and a
plan for reparation that was satisfactory to
France, the French withdrew. The message
ofthe incident, however, was that the
French national debt would have to be
borne domestically. In 1924, taxes were
increased sharply.
Thefollowingyearsawthe short reigns ofsix
finance ministers. France's economic prob-
lems were horrific. The repaymentofprin-
cipalon the internal national debtamounted
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to two-thirdsofthe national budget. The
threats ofconfiscatorytaxation and infla-
tionary finance as solutions to the budget
crisis were readily apparent. The repayment
ofprincipal alone amounted to 22 billion
francs in 1926, and the deficittotalled 36
billion francs. The linkbetween deficits and
monetarygrowth was clear-bank note
circulation grew by about 25 percent. The
result was a capital flight that caused the
value ofthe French franc to plummetfrom
26.5 francs per dollar in January 1926 to
40.96 francs perdollar in July 1926.
InJuneof1926, Briand becamepremierand
Caillaux, ministeroffinanee. Caillaux pro-
ceeded to argue that he be given broad
powers to make agreements with the
Banque de France without pariiamentary
approval. But Parliament balked, and on
July 17, the government was overturned. In
the shortperiod betweenJuly 15 and July 20,
the franc depreciated from about40 francs
to the U.S. dollarto over 50 francs. A full
financial and political crisis was at hand.
1926and Poincare
As in the current debates overthe u.s.
deficit, public concern seemed focused on
the inabilityofthe factions within govern-
mentto find an economically workable and
politicallyacceptable solution tothe deficit
problem. The extent ofthe political crisis
can be measured by the longevity ofthe
Herriotgovernrnent; it lasted only forty-
eight hours.
Precipitating its fall was the act ofthe
governor ofthe Banque de France, Emile
Moreau, who refused to lend any more
money to the government unless the legal
limiton the Banque's lending ability was
approved. Hebroughtthis issuetoahead on
July 21,1926, in a lettertoM. de Monzieof
the Treasury: "It is to be feared that...our
weekly statement...will show an excess of
a,dvanees to the state overthe legal limit
which will oblige the Banque to cease
making payments everywhere forthe
accountofthe Treasury."3
December 1926, thefranc rose from 40.96
to 25.33 Ffr/$.
Joseph Bisignano
The 1926 lesson ofPoincare is thatdeficits
neednotlead tocurrencydepreciation ifthe
central bank and the fiscal authorities can
convince the public that they will not be
monetized without restraint. Deficits need
not be inflationary, but history has shown
that they often are.
The franc's return to stability was indeed
incredible. Itremained relatively constantat
around 25 francsto the dollarfrom 1927 to
1932, yet the Poincare "miracle" contained
nothing startlingly new in terms ofpolicy.
Instead, historians recall the simplicity,
consistency and speed with which Poin-
care's proposals wereadopted. They believe
these qualities were primarily responsible
forfostering public confidence in thefaceof
the potential for inflation from large
governmentdeficits that still existed and a
central bankthat lacked independencefrom
the Treasury.
The lesson
As M. Poincare experienced in 1926, the
valueofa nation's currency is sensitive to
the relationship between the government
agency that spends money and the agency
that creates it. The present strength ofthe
U.S. dollar in international markets, which
appears greaterthan that warranted by
relative pricecomparisons with its trading
partners, maybe ameasureofconfidence in
ourcentral bank. Excessive monetization of
U.S. deficits in the months and years ahead
could just as easily result in a U.s. dollar as




Poincare also gavethe BanquedeFrance an
additional elementofpowerand autonomy.
A law was passed defining "agreements" of
the central bank with respect to treasury
loans and the limits on note circulation. The
lackofpolitical independenceofthe central
bank from theTreasury had been an obvious
source ofthe 1926 crisis. Moreover, the law
gave the Banque de France the abiIity to
engage in the buying and selling offoreign
exchange, thereby permittingthe banktotry.
directlytostabiIizethe franc intheexchange
markets. Poincare also argued before
the Chamber ofDeputies for a return to the
gold standard and to gold convertibility to
restore faith in the franc. From July to
Almost as ifby magic, the French franc
began to stabilize in the foreign exchange
markets after he took office. Poincare's
major policy efforts were to reduce
government expenditures and to increase
government revenues. He increased the
applicabilityofabusiness turnovertax,
raised the luxury tax and increased irnport
duties, while at the same time loweringthe
tax rate on thehighest incomebrackets from
60 to 30 percent.
THE FRENCH FRANC/U.S. DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE
Francs par U.S. Dollar Fraocs per U.S. Dollar
OnJuly 25,1926, a newgovernment was
formed byM. Raymond Poincare. Consis-
tent with the nature ofboth the political and
economic crises, he also assumed the posi-
tion ofministeroffinance. Poincare, an
old-time conservative politician was almost
66 at the time ofthe crisis and had had
considerable experience in previous
governments. On the domestic front he was
earlier instrumental in obtaining major
electoral reform in the passing ofa propor-
tional representation bill. In foreign affairs
he is recalled as having stressed the impor-
tance ofcontinuity and clarity. For the
French, Poincare represented stability.U01~U!lISE'M. 4E'1n • uo~aJO • epeAaN • 04ePI














BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)
SelectedAssets and liabilities
Large Commercial Banks
loans(gross, adjusted) and investments" 162,289 - 567 2,244 1.4
loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 140,760 - 586 1,533 1.1
Commercial and industrial 44,179 37 714 1.6
Real estate 56,229 29 - 1,153 - 2.0
loans to individuals 23,788 58 435 1.9
Securities loans 2,403 - 256 138 6.1
U.S. Treasury securities'" 8,279 22 1,710 26.0
Othersecurities* 13,249 - 3 - 1,000 - 7.0
Demand deposits - total# 40,158 -3,955 2,992 8.1
Demanddeposits - adjusted 28,540 -1,735 2,346 9.0
Savings deposits - totalt 66,446 - 746 36,103 119.0
Time deposits - total# 65,206 931 - 29,837 - 31.4
Individuals, part. & corp. 59,161 1,013 - 26,175 - 30.7
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* Excludes trading account securities.
# Includes items notshown separately.
t Includes MoneyMarket DepositAccounts, Super-NOW accounts, and NOWaccounts.
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